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THE OECD’S CALL FOR AN END TO
“CORROSIVE” FACILITATION PAYMENTS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON THE
FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION UNDER
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Jon Jordan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 15, 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (―OECD‖), the leading economic organization of the
world, issued a report on the United States criticizing its foreign antibribery policies regarding facilitation payments.1 Facilitation or ―grease‖
payments, small bribes designed to expedite the performance of routine
governmental actions, have always been allowed under the United States‘
foreign anti-bribery statute, the Foreign Corruption Practices Act

* Mr. Jordan is a Senior Investigations Counsel with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Unit of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖). Mr. Jordan has
held various positions in the SEC‘s Miami and Washington D.C. offices, most recently
serving as a Branch Chief. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees.
The views expressed herein, including views regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(―FCPA‖) Unit and the Commission‘s FCPA program, are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commission‘s FCPA Unit, or of the
author‘s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], United States: Phase 3, Report on
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 22-24, (Oct. 15, 2010) [hereinafter
Phase 3 Report], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (―OECD‖) is an international
organization consisting of thirty-three member countries with the mission of coordinating
domestic and international policies in furtherance of providing a better world economy,
promoting economic growth and development, and contributing to world trade. Information
about the OECD, including its mission with respect to the world economy, is available at
http://www.oecd.org.
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(―FCPA‖).2 The OECD has also always allowed for ―small‖ facilitation
payments in its foreign anti-bribery treaty, the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(―OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‖ or ―Convention‖).3 But in November
2009, the OECD changed its tune and called on all signatory nations to the
Convention to end the permissibility of ―corrosive‖ facilitation payments in
its Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials
(―OECD Recommendation‖).4 This call by the OECD placed it in
disagreement with the United States over the issue of facilitation payments,
and these divergent views came to a head in October 2010 when the OECD
criticized the United States for its policies on facilitation payments in a
report on the country‘s implementation of the OECD Recommendation.5
The OECD‘s recent actions, as well as other international nongovernmental calls for ending facilitation payments, have put the United
States under strong international pressure to change its policies regarding
facilitation payments. This would require amending the FCPA to change
or eliminate its controversial facilitation payments exception, a difficult

2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a), (dd), (ff), (m) (2010)) [hereinafter FCPA]. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2010) (providing exceptions to the FCPA‘s otherwise stringent
prohibitions for ―any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party,
or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine
governmental action . . . .‖). Legislators and others often refer to small bribes acting as
facilitation payments as ―grease‖ payments as such payments are intended to ―lubricate‖ the
―wheels‖ that ―bureaucratic friction would otherwise grind to a halt.‖ Charles B.
Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the
Scope of the Routine Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 509, 517 (2010);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (explaining that the Unlawful Corporate
Payments Act of 1977 did not extend its coverage to ―so-called grease or facilitating
payments‖).
3. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999), 37 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention or Convention], at Commentary 9. The OECD
adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997. The Convention obligates signatory
countries to enact domestic anti-bribery laws, similar to the FCPA, that criminalize the
bribery of foreign officials. Id., at art. 1.
4. See OECD Working Grp. on Bribery of Foreign Pub. Officials in Int‘l Bus.
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 4 (Nov. 26, 2009) (amended Feb.
18,
2010)
[hereinafter
OECD
Recommendation],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C(2009)159/REV
1/FINAL&docLanguage=En (recommending that ―Member countries . . . undertake to
periodically review their policies and approach on small facilitation payments . . . [and]
encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of [such] payments . . . .‖).
5. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24.
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task that would require congressional legislation at the very least.6
Nevertheless, a growing distaste for facilitation payments, both
domestically and internationally, in the modern-day anti-bribery era has
signaled that the time may be ripe for the United States to revisit seriously
the facilitation payments exception and consider eliminating it.
This article will give a basic outline of the FCPA and the facilitation
payments exception. The article will then explore the history behind the
exception. The article will discuss the United States‘ pursuit of an
international agreement prohibiting foreign bribery and the resulting OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention. The article will then focus on international and
domestic disdain over the issue of facilitation payments during the first
decade of the Convention. Next, the article will consider the recent OECD
Recommendation calling on the prohibition of facilitation payments and the
OECD‘s recent criticisms of the United States with respect to its policies
on facilitation payments. The author will then give his prediction that the
facilitation payments exception will be eliminated. Finally, the author will
provide his recommendation that domestic companies prohibit the use of
facilitation payments in the current global anti-bribery environment.
II.

THE FCPA

The FCPA was created in 1977 in response to findings by the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) that numerous
public companies had engaged in questionable payments overseas and
falsified their accounting entries with respect to those payments in their
books and records.7 The FCPA imposes civil and criminal liability for the
bribery of foreign government officials, political party officials, and
candidates for political office, in order to obtain or retain business.8 It also
mandates certain accounting requirements for domestic and certain foreign
6. See infra note 223 and accompanying discussion.
7. See FCPA, supra note 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 6-7 (1977) (noting that
legislative proposals leading up to the passing of the Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of
1977 were based on an ―extensive [report] . . . issued by the SEC on May 12, 1976 . . . [that]
revealed the widespread nature of the practice of questionable corporate foreign
payments.‖); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (indicating that the Unlawful Corporate
Payments Act of 1977 was introduced at the request of the SEC, after it presented its
findings of ―widespread‖ payments that were ―questionable or illegal‖); see also SEC,
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12,
1976) (submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs), at 2–3, 54–
56 (describing how illegal corporate payments were first uncovered during the
investigations of the Watergate Special Prosecutor in 1973, leading to the SEC‘s
involvement, and concluding that ―while the problem of [such] payments is both serious and
widespread, it can be controlled . . . .‖).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -2(g), -3(a), -3(e) (2010).
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companies with securities publicly-traded in the United States, and requires
them to report illicit payments.9 The FCPA was amended in 1988 to clarify
some of its provisions in response to criticisms over the original statute.10
It was amended again in 1998 to conform to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention.11
The FCPA‘s provisions cover certain accounting requirements and
anti-bribery prohibitions. The accounting provisions impose recordkeeping
and internal controls requirements for companies that have a class of
securities registered with the SEC or that are required to file reports with
the SEC.12 The anti-bribery provisions outlaw the bribery of foreign
government officials for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business,
directing business to another person, or securing any improper advantage.13
A.

The Accounting Provisions

The FCPA‘s accounting provisions require that issuers, which are
companies that have a class of securities registered with the SEC or that are
required to file reports with the SEC, maintain certain recordkeeping
standards and internal accounting controls.14 The recordkeeping provision

9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010).
10. The FCPA was amended as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title V, Subtitle A, Part I, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 Amendments]. This was signed into law on August 23, 1988.
11. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, signed into law
on November 10, 1998, amended the FCPA to conform its provisions to the Convention.
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Amendments].
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010). The FCPA is both a civil and criminal
statute, and part of it has been incorporated into the federal securities laws. As a result, the
United States Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) is responsible for criminal enforcement of the
FCPA and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers, and the
SEC is responsible for all civil enforcement of the accounting provisions and for civil
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers. See Mike Koehler, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L.
REV. 389, 395-96 (2010) (describing the DOJ‘s responsibility ―for all criminal enforcement‖
of the statute and civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers subject
to the FCPA, as well as the SEC‘s role in regulating issuers).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010). ―Issuers‖ are those companies that have a class of
securities registered with the SEC or that are required to file reports with the SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 78(l)(g), (o)(d) (2010). This includes foreign companies that list American
Depository Receipts (―ADRs‖) on a stock exchange. Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (―Exchange Act‖) requires every issuer to keep accurate books and
records and establish and maintain a system of internal accounting controls. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b)(2) (2010). Rule 13b2-1 provides that ―[n]o person shall directly or indirectly,
falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A)‖
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requires that all issuers ―make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.‖15 The internal controls
provision requires that issuers create a system of internal accounting
controls that provide ―reasonable assurances‖ that transactions are executed
in ―accordance with management‘s general or specific authorization.‖16
Civil liability will be found with respect to violations of these provisions,
and criminal liability will also attach under these provisions when a person
―knowingly‖ circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal
accounting controls or ―knowingly‖ falsifies the books and records.17
B.

The Anti-Bribery Provisions

The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit the bribing of foreign
government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business,
directing business to other persons, or securing any improper advantage.18
Specifically, the FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit: any issuer,
domestic concern, or any person acting within U.S. territory, or any officer,
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on behalf of any of the
foregoing from using any means or instrumentality of U.S commerce
―corruptly‖ in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of anything of value to any ―foreign official,‖
any foreign political party or party official, any candidate for foreign
political office, any public international organization official, or any other
person while ―knowing‖ that the payment or promise to pay will be given
to any of the foregoing for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of

of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1. Rule 13b2-2 ―prohibits a director or officer
of an issuer from making or causing to be made any materially false or misleading statement
or omission in connection with any audit.‖ 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2010). All transactions by issuers are covered under the
recordkeeping provision, not just transactions that raise FCPA concerns.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2010). The provision specifically requires that issuers
―devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management‘s
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management‘s general or specific authorization; [and] (iv) the recorded accountability for
assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences.‖ Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4), (5) (2010). Criminal liability will not flow from a violation
of the accounting provisions absent this ―knowingly‖ standard. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010).
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that person in his or her official capacity, inducing that person to do or omit
to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, securing any improper
advantage, or inducing that person to use his influence with a foreign
government to affect or influence any government act or decision; in order
to assist such issuer, domestic concern, or person acting within U.S.
territory, in obtaining or retaining business, or directing business to any
person.19 The definition of ―issuer‖ is the same as that under the FCPA
accounting provisions.20 The definition of ―domestic concern‖ means any
U.S. citizen, national or resident, as well as any corporation, partnership or
association, regardless of whether they issue securities, which has its
principal place of business in the United States or that is incorporated in the
United States.21
There are two affirmative defenses to the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions for certain types of payments. The first affirmative defense is
when the payment at issue is lawful under the written laws of the relevant
foreign officials‘ country.22 The second affirmative defense allows for
certain payments made for ―reasonable and bona fide‖ expenditures.23
Reasonable and bona fide expenditures include things such as travel and
lodging expenses incurred by the foreign official and must be directly
related to ―the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or
services,‖ or ―the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign
government or agency.‖24
III. THE FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION
A.

Statutory Language of the Facilitation Payments Exception
Of relevance to the subject matter of this article is the fact that there is

19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010). There is both criminal and civil liability
for violations of the anti-bribery provisions and the provisions have been incorporated into
the federal securities laws as Section 30A of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The
term ―foreign official‖ means ―any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international
organization.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (2010).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g) (2010); see also supra note 14 and accompanying discussion.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2010). The FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions do not
generally apply to foreign corporations unless some action in furtherance of the bribe occurs
within the territory of the United States. Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428,
439 (D.D.C. 1992).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1) (2010).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2010).
24. Id.
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an exception to the FCPA anti-bribery provisions that permits so-called
―facilitation‖ or ―grease‖ payments to foreign officials for the purposes of
expediting or securing the performance of a ―routine governmental
action.‖25 The term ―routine governmental action‖ means any action that is
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official, such as obtaining
permits, processing visas, and lining up basic services.26 More specifically,
the statute itself defines ―routine governmental action‖ as:
[A]n action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a
foreign official in:
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents
to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work
orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery,
or scheduling inspections associated with contract
performance or inspections related to transit of goods
across the country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply,
loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable
products or commodities from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.27
Payments made to expedite any of the basic services listed above or
―of a similar nature,‖ are not considered violative payments prohibited by
the FCPA.28 However, what constitutes ―actions of a similar nature‖
beyond the specific definition of the exception itself is uncertain. What is
certain is that such actions cannot be related to the awarding of new
business or continued business.29 The FCPA specifically provides that:
The term routine governmental action does not include any
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or
any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award new business to
or to continue business with a particular party.30
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2010).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A) (2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B) (2010).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B) (2010) (internal quotations
omitted). The DOJ has stated that ―a determination of whether or not a payment is for
‗facilitation‘ or is made with corrupt intent hinges upon whether the payment is made to
obtain or retain business and whether it is routine in nature (such as connecting a phone) or
discretionary (such as assessing a customs duty).‖ OECD Working Group on Bribery,

JORDANFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)

888

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/12/2011 5:10 PM

[Vol. 13:4

There are several important things to note about the facilitation
payments exception and the exception‘s practical application under both
domestic and foreign law. First, the facilitation payments exception applies
only to the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions and not to the accounting
provisions.31 Therefore, issuers that make facilitation payments, but do not
properly record such payments in their books and records, will still be
liable under the FCPA‘s accounting provisions.32
Second, almost every country in the world, including the United
States, outlaws facilitation payments under their respective domestic
bribery laws.33 This poses a unique problem since corporations making
facilitation payments may be very hesitant to properly record such
payments, because doing so would be essentially tantamount to confessing
to bribes in violation of a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery
law. The making of facilitation payments thus creates a strong inducement
for companies to conceal or falsify the true purpose of such payments in
violation of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions. This leaves issuers who
make facilitation payments with a Catch-22 every time that they do so. On
the one hand, the issuers could properly record the payments in their books
and records and run the risk of criminal liability under a relevant foreign
jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery law. On the other, they could conceal or
falsely record the payments in their books and records and run the risk of
violating the FCPA‘s accounting provisions. Either way, it is a lose-lose
situation.
Another important aspect of the facilitation payments exception is that
Response of the United States, Questions Concerning Phase 3, at 25 (May 3, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf. If a payment is
made ―to secure something to which the payor is entitled, as opposed to an act that is
discretionary, it is more likely to lack the necessary mens rea to be a violation‖ of the
FCPA. Id.
31. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in
the United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, 1665 PLI/CORP 711,
725 (2008).
32. Id.
33. See Thomas Fox, End of Grease Payments Coming, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS,
Apr. 5, 2010, at 3 (reiterating that facilitation payments are illegal in all countries in which
they occur); Melissa Aguilar, New OECD Stance on Facilitation Payments, COMPLIANCE
WEEK, Dec. 18, 2009 (noting that facilitation payments ―are illegal under local law in all of
the countries in which they‘re paid‖); TRACE, TRACE FACILITATION PAYMENTS
BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2 (2009) [hereinafter TRACE SURVEY] (describing how TRACE
represents itself to be a non-profit, non-voting membership association ―that pools resources
to provide practical and cost-effective anti-bribery compliance for multinational
companies‖); see also www.traceinternational.org/about (indicating that TRACE is funded
by membership fees from ―member companies‖ (multinational corporations) and ―member
intermediaries‖ (commercial intermediaries used by multinational corporations such as
agents, sales representatives, consultants or dealers)).
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it is somewhat unique to the United States and the FCPA, and is not an
exception under most foreign anti-bribery laws.34 Only five countries in the
world, including the United States, provide an exception for facilitation
payments under their relevant foreign anti-bribery laws.35 Therefore,
domestic companies that make and properly record facilitation payments in
compliance with the FCPA can still find themselves liable for such
payments under some other country‘s foreign anti-bribery law.
B.

History Behind the Facilitation Payments Exception

To understand the purpose of the facilitation payments exception and
why it was created when it was, one needs to look at the legislative history
behind the exception and the era in which it was created. In today‘s global
anti-bribery environment, where few countries allow for facilitation
payments, it is hard to understand why the United States created the
exception in the first place. However, when one looks back at the
international business climate during the time of the drafting of the FCPA,
it is easy to understand why the exception was included and desired as part
of the original statute.
1.

Congress Creates the Facilitation Payments Exception in the
Original FCPA

The original version of the FCPA enacted in 1977 provided an
exception for facilitation payments, but it was very different from the
exception as it exists today.36 At the time, the exception existed through a
combination of statutory language and legislative history indicating
Congress‘s intent to specifically carve out an exception for so-called
―grease‖ payments through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖37
a.

The Facilitation Payments Exception‟s Original Existence
under the Definition of a “Foreign Official”

In the original version of the FCPA, the facilitation payments
exception existed through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖38 The

34. Low, Bonheimer & Katirai, supra note 31, at 725.
35. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2.
36. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see also Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517
(explaining that Congress created a legislative exception, distinguishing facilitating
payments from bribes).
38. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT
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definition of a ―foreign official‖ at the time excluded those employees of a
foreign government whose ―duties‖ were essentially ―ministerial or
clerical.‖39 Thus, payments made to an official whose duties were
―ministerial or clerical‖ would not be considered improper payments made
to a ―foreign official,‖ as prohibited by the FCPA.40
The legislative history behind the drafting of the FCPA reveals that
Congress intended to carve out an exception for facilitation payments
through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖41
The House of
Representatives‘ Report into the legislation creating the FCPA (―House
Report‖) stated that the ―bill‘s coverage‖ did ―not extend to so-called
grease or facilitating payments.‖42 To this end, the House Report stated
that the bill‘s language was ―deliberately‖ drafted in a way, through the
definition of a ―foreign official,‖ so as to ―differentiate‖ between payments
prohibited by the FCPA and ―grease payments‖ allowed under the statute.43
The Senate Report on the original FCPA also indicated the same.44 The
Senate Report stated that the FCPA was supposed to cover ―payments
made to foreign officials for the purposes of obtaining business‖ and not to
―cover so-called ‗grease payments.‘‖45

PRACTICES ACT 2 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and
American Business After 1977 5 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266,
1995) (noting the ministerial or clerical exception to the FCPA‘s grease payment policy).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
43. Id. The House Report stated that by using the word ―corruptly‖ in the FCPA,
Congress had intended to ―distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise
other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those
payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or
which do not involve any discretionary action.‖ Id. at 8. The House Report noted that
through the definition of ―foreign official‖ that Congress ―emphasize[d] this crucial
distinction‖ by excluding from the definition of a ―foreign official‖ those government
employees whose duties were of a ―ministerial or clerical‖ nature. Id. The House Report
stated that ―[f]or example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a
customs document would not be reached by the bill‖ and that it would also not reach
―payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar
duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity by performed
in any event.‖ Id.
44. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
45. Id. The Senate Report stated in this respect that the FCPA did not ―cover so-called
‗grease payments‘ such as payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a
transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police
protection, transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.‖ Id.
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Congress‟s Acquiescence Towards “Reprehensible”
Facilitation Payments

The legislative history behind the enactment of the FCPA provides an
interesting glimpse into a Congress that created the exception for
facilitation payments, despite its view that facilitation payments were
―reprehensible.‖46 Congress was concerned during the time of the drafting
of the FCPA in the late seventies that facilitation payments appeared to be a
part of doing business internationally and that unilaterally prohibiting
domestic companies from making them, on top of the restrictions already
imposed by the FCPA, would place them at a competitive disadvantage in
the global marketplace.47 This concern by Congress is best revealed in the
following passage from a House Report:
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper
performance of a foreign official‘s duties may be reprehensible
in the United States, the [Congress] recognizes that they are not
necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate
all such payments.48
This passage clearly indicates Congress‘s disdain for facilitation
payments during the drafting of the FCPA, while also revealing its
recognition that ―unilaterally‖ prohibiting them would have harmed
domestic companies and their ability to compete in the international
marketplace.49 In this respect, Congress appeared to acquiesce to the
necessary evil of allowing for facilitation payments, given the burden
already imposed on domestic companies as a result of the FCPA.50
2.

The 1988 Amendments Call on the United States Government to
Pursue an International Anti-Bribery Agreement through the
OECD

The FCPA was the subject of much criticism after the passage of the
new statute.51 Many in the business community complained that the FCPA
had put domestic companies at a disadvantage to their foreign competitors,
since domestic companies could no longer pay the bribes often necessary to
46. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis by this author). The House Report then stated ―[a]s a result, the
[Congress] has not attempted to reach such payments.‖ Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517.
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land lucrative government contracts that their foreign counterparts could.52
Some also argued that this disadvantage resulted in a downturn in
profitability for many domestic companies.53 This led some critics to call
for an international agreement with the world‘s industrialized countries that
would impose on foreign companies the same kind of prohibitions that
domestic companies were facing under the FCPA.54 The idea was that if
foreign companies were under the same kind of anti-bribery laws as
domestic companies were, the playing field would be more level and
foreign competitors would no longer have an unfair advantage.55
Outside of the adverse competitive effects of the FCPA, critics also
complained that the language within the FCPA was vague, especially with
respect to the facilitation payments exception.56 These critics argued that
the FCPA did not specifically spell out, by their purpose, what permissible
grease payments were, as legislative history had suggested, but instead
focused on the recipient‘s position and whether the recipient‘s duties were
―ministerial or clerical.‖57 These critics argued that the vagueness in the
exception, along with other parts of the FCPA, had created a chilling effect
in the export trade market for many domestic companies, since many
companies had stopped dealing in the market altogether due to the
uncertainties of complying with the FCPA.58 These critics contended that
the FCPA needed more specific guidelines, including better language in the
facilitation payments exception.59
a.

Clarification of the Facilitation Payments Exception

As a result of the criticisms, for several years Congress considered
amending the FCPA.60 Congress recognized that it had intended to create
an exception for facilitation payments, but that the practical application of
the exception, as spelled out within the statute, was unworkable.61 After
52. Id.
53. See Alexandros Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing
the Exemption for “Routine Government Action” Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT‘L L. REV. 251,
256 (2006) (suggesting that critics believed the FCPA posed a major competitive burden to
American businesses, placing them at a disadvantage to corrupt foreign competitors).
54. SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3.
55. Id.
56. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517.
57. Id. at 518.
58. SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3. Some of the critics of the FCPA, as originally
enacted, have estimated that its provisions cost as much as one billion dollars annually in
eliminated export trade. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987) (―However, there has been some
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many hearings and debates spanning three different Congresses, the FCPA
was finally amended in 1988 to clarify several provisions within the statute,
including the facilitation payments exception.62
Through the 1988 Amendments, Congress codified the exception into
its present day form by allowing domestic corporations to make payments
for the purposes of expediting a ―routine governmental action.‖63 In doing
so, the amendments changed the exception‘s focus from the status of a
payment recipient and shifted it to the purpose of the payment itself.64
b.

A Call to Pursue an International Anti-Bribery Agreement
through the OECD

It is important to note that in the 1988 Amendments, Congress
recognized the criticisms that domestic companies were at a disadvantage
in comparison to foreign companies as a result of the FCPA, and called on
the United States government to pursue an international agreement to
prohibit foreign bribery.65 The 1988 Amendments specifically called on
the President of the United States to pursue the international agreement
through the OECD.66 Specifically, the 1988 Amendments stated:
Negotiations. It is the sense of the Congress that the President
should pursue the negotiation of an international agreement,
among the members of the [O]rganization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those
countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and

criticism that the current statutory language does not clearly reflect Congressional intent and
the boundaries of prohibited conduct.‖); see also Weinograd, supra note 2, at 518 (citing S.
REP. NO. 100-85, at 53 (1987)) (―Notwithstanding the intent to exempt facilitating payments
from the FCPA‘s bribery prohibition, the method chosen by Congress in 1977 to accomplish
this has been difficult to apply in practice.‖).
62. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3; Hines, supra
note 40, at 4.
63. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 518; 1988 Amendments, supra note 10.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -1(f)(3)(A), -2(b), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(b), -3(f)(4)(A) (2010);
1988 Amendments, supra note 10.
65. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988).
66. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10. The House of Representatives‘ bill related to the
1988 Amendments originally stated that the President should pursue the negotiation of an
international agreement ―among the largest possible number of countries‖ to ―govern acts‖
prohibited by the FCPA. H.R. CONFERENCE REP. NO. 100-576, at 924 (1988). The Senate
bill contained no such provision. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10, at 1424. After a
conference agreement on the legislation, the Senate ended up conceding to the House, with
an amendment that an international agreement be pursued with the member countries of the
OECD. Id.
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domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section.67
Thus, the 1988 Amendments created a mandate for the United States
to push other countries to enact similar foreign anti-bribery laws similar to
those of the FCPA, so that the United States would no longer be alone in
fighting foreign bribery throughout the world.68 Interestingly, the 1988
Amendments chose the OECD as the avenue through which to pursue this
goal.69
IV. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
With the congressional direction in the 1998 Amendments to go
through the OECD in encouraging other countries to enter into an
international anti-bribery agreement, the United States got to work.70 In
1989, the United States began pushing OECD member countries to enact
an international agreement with prohibitions similar to that of the FCPA.71
These efforts led to the OECD‘s adoption of a non-binding package of
recommendations in 1994 concerning foreign bribery which, among other
things, recommended that member countries ―take effective measures to
deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in
connection with international business transactions.‖72 A few years later, in
1997, the OECD evaluated the measures implemented by member
countries in following the recommendations and at that time the United
States delegation to the OECD pushed harder for an international antibribery agreement.73
A.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‟s Prohibitions
Ultimately, the United States‘ efforts led to the OECD‘s adoption of

67. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988). The passage then goes on to
state that ―[s]uch international agreement should include a process by which problems and
conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved.‖ 1988 Amendments, supra note 10.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998).
71. H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 13 (1998); Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: It‟s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L.
REV. 379, 387 (2005).
72. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business
Transactions,
at
3
(adopted
on
May
27,
1994),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/52/1952622.pdf.
73. Koch, supra note 71, at 387.
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the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997.74 The Convention is an
international agreement that requires signatory countries to enact laws in
conformity with its provisions designed to criminalize the bribery of
foreign officials.75 On December 17, 1997, thirty countries signed the
Convention, and on February 15, 1999, the Convention officially entered
into force.76 Today, the Convention has been signed and ratified by thirtyeight countries, consisting of the leading business and trading nations in the
world.77
The Preamble to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention states that
―bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business
transactions‖ which ―raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts
competitive conditions.‖78 The Preamble then declares that ―all countries
share a responsibility‖ in combating ―bribery in international business
transactions.‖79
The core anti-bribery provisions in the Convention are contained in
Article 1.80 Specifically, Article 1 of the Convention, entitled ―The Offence
74. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3.
75. Id. During the twenty-year time frame from the United States‘ enactment of the
FCPA to the time of the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the United States
was practically alone in ―criminalizing foreign bribery.‖ H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11 (1998).
In 1998 the United States amended the FCPA to confirm its provisions to the Convention
through the 1998 Amendments. 1998 Amendments, supra note 11. In signing the 1998
Amendments, President Bill Clinton stated that ―[s]ince the enactment in 1977 of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. business have faced criminal penalties if they engaged
in business-related bribery of foreign public officials‖ while their ―foreign competitors . . .
did not have similar restrictions and could engage in their corrupt activity without fear of
penalty.‖ Statement by President William J. Clinton, Nov. 10, 1998. He stated that ―as a
result, U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field, resulting in losses
of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per year.‖ Id.
76. H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 13 (1998); Press Release, OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention:
Entry
into
Force
of
the
Convention,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html.
77. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been ratified by all thirty-three OECD
member countries. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Public Transactions, Ratification Status as of March 2009, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf. Five countries that are not members of
the OECD have also agreed to sign the document. These countries include Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia, and South Africa. Id. Noteworthy countries that have yet to sign
the Convention are China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia. Id. However efforts have
been undertaken by the OECD to encourage these nations to join the Convention. OECD,
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2009, at 11, (2009) [hereinafter OCED
2009
Report],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_34857_44271086_1_1_1_1,00.html.
78. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble.
79. Id.
80. Id. at art. 1.
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of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials,‖ requires that:
Each [p]arty shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business.81
Article 1 also states that ―[e]ach [p]arty shall take any measures
necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and
abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official
shall be a criminal offence.‖82 Thus, Article 1 obligates signatory countries
to enact laws, in conformity with the prohibitions contained in the
Convention, designed to specifically prohibit and criminalize the bribery of
foreign public officials.83
B.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‟s Permissibility of “Small”
Facilitation Payments

The articles within the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention are silent as to
the issue of facilitation payments.84 Nevertheless, Commentary 9 to the
Convention, relevant to the application and interpretation of Article 1,
provides an exception for ―small‖ facilitation payments.85 Specifically, the
first sentence of Commentary 9 provides that:
[S]mall ―facilitation‖ payments do not constitute payments made
―to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage‖ within

81. Id. It is worth noting that the 1998 Amendments had to add the ―improper
advantage‖ language to the FCPA to conform it to the Convention. 1998 Amendments,
supra note 11.
82. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1. Article 1 furthermore
provides that ―[a]ttempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal
offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that
Party.‖ Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. This is likely because the FCPA‘s exception for facilitation payments attracted
international criticism of the exception during the implementation of the Convention. Koch,
supra note 71, at 393.
85. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. Commentaries to
the Convention were adopted by the Negotiating Conference on November 21, 1997. Id.
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the meaning of paragraph 1 [of Article 1] and, accordingly, are
also not an offence.86
The Convention therefore allows an exception for ―small‖ facilitation
payments from the relevant anti-bribery prohibitions.87 Despite allowing
for the exception, the rest of Commentary 9 then goes on to criticize
facilitation payments.88
Calling facilitation payments a ―corrosive
phenomenon,‖ the commentary stresses the need to address such payments
through good corporate governance programs.89 The commentary then
ironically stops short of calling for the criminalization of such payments. 90
In this respect, the remainder of Commentary 9 provides:
Such payments, which, in some countries, are made to induce
public officials to perform their functions, such as issuing
licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country
concerned. Other countries can and should address this corrosive
phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good
governance. However, criminalisation by other countries does
not seem a practical or effective complementary action.91
It is important to note several things regarding Commentary 9. First,
from the beginning the OECD did not have a favorable view of facilitation
payments when it originally drafted the Convention, calling them a
―corrosive phenomenon.‖92 Nevertheless, the OECD opted to tackle the
problem through calling on signatory countries to support good governance
programs, rather than necessarily criminalizing the payments themselves.93
This action, in a way, mirrored the United States and its behavior when it
enacted the FCPA, where Congress viewed facilitation payments as
―reprehensible,‖ yet provided an exception for these payments anyway.94
In addition, it is worth observing that the OECD specifically used the
word ―small‖ when referring to facilitation payments under the relevant
commentary.95
While arguably all facilitation payments could be
considered ―small‖ in nature, the term itself could be open to interpretation,
and in fact later did become a repetitive issue between the OECD and the
United States concerning the scope of the FCPA‘s facilitation payments
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (calling facilitation payments reprehensible
in the United States); see also supra notes 46 through 50 and accompanying discussion.
95. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.
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exception.96
It is also worth noting that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is the
only international agreement to recognize facilitation payments, to date.97
Amazingly, all of the other major international treaties governing foreign
bribery have been completely silent on the issue of facilitation payments.98
Presumably, this could mean that these other treaties do not provide for an
exception for facilitation payments.
V.

INTERNATIONAL DISDAIN FOR FACILITATION PAYMENTS IN THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION

The first decade of the Convention saw ever-growing scrutiny and
criticism of facilitation payments. The United States had finally gotten
what it wanted—an international network of countries banning the bribery
of foreign public officials—yet the avenue of doing so, through the
Convention, resulted in uninvited criticism of the facilitation payments
exception.
A.

Building OECD Criticism of the Facilitation Payments Exception

As noted before, signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
were required to take measures to enact domestic laws prohibiting foreign
bribery, to comply with the relevant provisions of the Convention.99 And
while all of the signatory countries did so, only five had foreign antibribery laws allowing for facilitation payments, with these countries being
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States.100
96. See infra notes 112 and 202 and accompanying discussion (describing the problem
of using the word ―small‖ when discussing facilitation payments).
97. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.
98. The Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, the first multilateral anti-corruption treaty in the world when it was adopted in
1996, makes no reference to facilitation payments. Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724. Likewise, two major international anti-bribery
treaties adopted after the Convention are also silent with respect to facilitation payments.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted in 2003, says nothing about
facilitation payments. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.
Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003). Additionally, the African Union Convention on Preventing
and Combating Corruption, also adopted in 2003, is silent on the issue of facilitation
payments. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (the AU Corruption Convention entered into force on Aug. 5, 2006). The
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention therefore appears to be the only global or multilateral
treaty that addresses and allows for an exception for facilitation payments within its
provisions. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.
99. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1.
100. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2; Claudius O. Sokenu, FCPA News and Insights,
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Some might consider the small number of countries allowing for
facilitation payments odd, given that the Convention specifically allowed
for an exception.101 However, the limited number may not be so odd when
taking into account that almost every domestic bribery law in the world
outlaws the making of facilitation payments.102
Following the passage of the Convention, the OECD began to monitor
how countries implemented and enforced the relevant domestic legislations
implementing the Convention‘s prohibitions. This monitoring was done by
the OECD Working Group on Bribery (―OECD Working Group‖ or
―Working Group‖) and involved several different phases.103 Phase 1 of the
monitoring involved an evaluation of whether signatory countries had
adequately implemented the Convention under their own domestic
legislations.104 Phase 2 of the review then assessed whether signatory

An Update on Recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Global Anti-Corruption
Enforcement, Litigation, and Compliance Developments, 1814 PLI/CORP 641, 652 (2010);
Fox, supra note 33, at 3.
101. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. While the United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea explicitly provided for the
facilitation payment exception in their own laws, the countries of Denmark, Slovakia,
Sweden, Norway and Switzerland recognized Commentary 9 to the Convention by
expressing, through interpretations of their own relevant foreign anti-bribery laws or
otherwise, that small facilitation payments may not fall within the prohibitions of their
relevant foreign anti-bribery laws. Zervos, supra note 53, at 252 n. 8.
102. See, e.g., TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2 (explaining that only a few
jurisdictions allow grease payments).
103. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Country Monitoring of the
OECD
Anti-Bribery
Convention,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html.
This monitoring was provided for under Article 12 of the Convention. OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, supra note 3, at art. 12. The Working Group is made up of representatives
from the signatory countries that are parties to the Convention, and the group meets four
times a year in Paris. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_34859_35430021_1_1_1_1,00.html.
The Working Group publishes its country monitoring reports online through the OECD
website. For an outline of issues concerning country monitoring as agreed to by the
Working Group on Bribery, see the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs,
Country Monitoring Principles for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, [hereinafter
Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention], available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,3343,en_2649_34859_44976877_1_1_1_1,00.html.
104. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 103. This
phase entailed looking at the written legislative text implementing the Convention and the
relevant elements of the signatory countries‘ legal systems in evaluating and determining
whether the Convention had been adequately implemented within the signatory countries‘
domestic legal frameworks. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Phase
1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2022613_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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countries had applied the implementing legislations effectively.105
1.

OECD Phase 1 Report of the United States

In April 1999, the OECD published its Phase 1 Report on the United
States‘ implementation of the Convention.106 In the Phase 1 Report, the
OECD Working Group expressed concern over the FCPA‘s definition of
―routine governmental action,‖ in that the definition contained a list of
specific payments that could be excepted from the FCPA‘s prohibitions.107
The Working Group felt that the list of specific payments under the
definition was ―not sufficiently qualified, for example by reference to the
size of the payment, and the discretionary nature and the legality of the
reciprocal act.‖108 In this regard, the Working Group remarked that the
definition and the exception were ―potentially subject to misuse.‖109
2.

OECD Phase 2 Report of the United States

A little over three years later, in October 2002, the OECD published
its Phase 2 Report on the United States‘ application of the Convention.110
In the Phase 2 Report, the OECD Working Group again criticized the
facilitation payments exception.111 This time, the Working Group criticized
the wording of the exception for not being limited to ―small‖ facilitation

105. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 103. This
phase looked into the enforcement structures designed to enforce the relevant laws
implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ―and to assess their application in
practice.‖ OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Phase 2 Country
Monitoring
of
the
OECD
Anti-Bribery
Convention,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2022939_1_1_1_1,00.html. In
2009, the Working Group adopted a new Phase 3 round of monitoring which involved,
among other things, looking at the signatory countries‘ enforcement of the Convention and
how these countries had implemented recommendations by the Working Group made in the
first two phases of monitoring. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying discussion. The
Phase 3 monitoring process also looked into how countries were responding and
implementing the OECD Recommendation. Id.
106. OECD, United States, Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997
Recommendation, (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Phase 1 Report], available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. OECD, United States: Phase 2, Report on Application of the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and
the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
(Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Phase 2 Report].
111. Id. at 34.
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payments, as provided for in the Convention.112 The Working Group also
criticized the United States for having an exception for facilitation
payments under the FCPA when there was no exception under its own
domestic bribery statute.113 The Working Group then stated that ―[t]o the
extent‖ that the exception was ―open to interpretation,‖ it ―may be regarded
as an area of risk and . . . misuse,‖ as previously noted in the Phase 1
Report.114
The Working Group also criticized the United States for what it
perceived to be an ―absence of any clear, published guidance‖ with respect
to the exception.115 The Working Group was concerned that there was not
a ―per se limit on the size of the payment‖ in the exception and that the
exception instead focused exclusively on the ―purpose‖ of the payment.116
The Working Group then suggested ―that there may be a case for guidance
to be issued by the U.S. Department of Justice (―DOJ‖)‖ in explaining how
it interpreted the exception. The Working Group formally recommended,
among other things, that the United States ―[c]onsider developing‖ such
―specific guidance.‖117
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. In this regard the Working Group noted that ―[n]o court has interpreted the
application of this exception and there are no settled cases to assist in delineating the
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable payments.‖ Id. The Working Group also
stated that there were ―also no relevant DOJ Opinions.‖ Id. The report stated that ―[i]f a
company asks the DOJ for informal advice or reports a payment, the lead examiners were
told that the DOJ will sometimes determine straight away, on the basis of judgment and
experience, whether it falls within the exception and if so, take no further action.‖ Id. The
Working Group felt that this operated ―as a sort of informal, undocumented ‗de minimis‘
rule.‖ Id.
117. Id. at 34, 38. The Working Group stated that ―[a]lternatively consideration should
be given to amending the wording‖ of the FCPA ―to clarify, for the benefit of all, that only
minor payments are allowable.‖ Id. at 34. On February 20, 2005, the United States
addressed the OECD Working Group‘s recommendations contained in the Phase 2 Report.
OECD, United States: Phase 2, Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2
Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 523 (June 1, 2005) [hereinafter Phase 2 Follow-up Report]. In response to the Working
Group‘s recommendation that the United States provide specific guidance on the facilitation
payments exception, the United States responded that ―[w]e presently believe that the
language of the FCPA, including its definition of ‗facilitating or expediting payments,‘ is
sufficient guidance.‖ Id. at 9. The United States also noted that the DOJ had an opinion
procedure in place that ―permits companies to request an opinion on whether specific, nonhypothetical, prospective conduct would violate the FCPA,‖ including conduct related to
facilitation payments, and stated that the DOJ ―does not presently intend to offer any
additional specific guidance outside of the Opinion Procedures.‖ Id. The Working Group in
turn responded in a follow-up report concerning its Phase 2 recommendations on June 1,

JORDANFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)

902
B.

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/12/2011 5:10 PM

[Vol. 13:4

International Non-Governmental Organizations calling for an End to
Facilitation Payments

While the OECD accepted, yet criticized, the use of facilitation
payments during the first decade of the Convention, certain other
international non-governmental organizations viewed these payments as
bribes and refused to accept them as permissible under any kind of law.
1.

Transparency International

Transparency International has been the most active and vocal
international non-governmental organization on the issue of foreign bribery
since the enactment of the Convention. It has also been a leading
international organization in the fight against corruption and is primarily
known for its ―Corruptions Perception Index,‖ which rates countries based
on how corrupt people perceive them to be.118
2005, that it still held ―the view that, in the continuous absence of authoritative guidance,
the existing exception for facilitation payments . . . may lead to uncertainty into the
interpretation of the FCPA.‖ Id. at 4. In this regard, the Phase 2 Follow Report concluded,
among other things, that the Working Group‘s recommendation of specific guidance in
relation to the facilitation payments exception still required ―further consideration from the
United States.‖ Id. On May 22, 2006, the OECD released its Mid-Term Study of Phase 2
Reports, which contained an analysis on the application of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention by all of the signatory countries. OECD, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports,
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery
in International Business Transactions, (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Mid-Term Study]. In
the Mid-Term Study the Working Group noted that it had recommended that the ―United
States consider developing guidance in relation to the facilitation payments exception‖ and
that the United States had responded that it felt that the FCPA‘s language was ―sufficient
guidance‖ in itself. Id. at 21. Perhaps foreshadowing a wind of change by the OECD on the
issue of facilitation payments, the Working Group then stated that it might ―undertake a
mid- to long-term analysis about whether the exception for ‗small facilitation payments‘ in
Commentary 9‖ was ―too vague to implement in practice.‖ Id. at 147.
118. See
About
Us,
TRANSPARENCY
INT‘L,
(Mar.
16,
2011),
http://www.transparency.org/about_us. Transparency International‘s ―mission‖ is a ―world
free of corruption.‖ Id. Transparency International was founded in 1993 and has a network
of more than ninety chapters throughout the world and an official international ―secretariat‖
based in Berlin, Germany. See TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009:
CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
at
i
(2009),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2009.
Transparency
International‘s
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 178 countries throughout the world. TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010.
The
2010
Corruption Perceptions Index listed Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, and
Sweden as the five least corrupt countries in the world. Id. On the opposite side of the
spectrum, the index listed Somalia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan as the five most
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Transparency International was a strong opponent of facilitation
payments during the first decade of the Convention, and during that time
took several steps to condemn and call for the elimination of facilitation
payments.119 In 2003, Transparency International published its Business
Principles for Countering Bribery, designed to help companies develop and
implement effective compliance programs geared towards the prevention of
bribery.120 The Business Principles, which stated that companies should
prohibit bribery ―in any form,‖ and implement a compliance program
designed to do so, specifically recommended that companies develop a
compliance program that would, among other things, prohibit the use of
facilitation payments.121
A year later in a ―Guidance Document‖ to the Business Principles,
Transparency International again spoke out against facilitation payments
and called on all companies to ―eliminate facilitation payments‖ in all
―jurisdictions in which they operate.‖122 In calling for this elimination of
facilitation payments, the organization stated that the ―corrupting influence
of pervasive facilitation payments‖ was something it considered to be
―insidious‖ and ―part of a wider climate of systemic corruption.‖123

corrupt countries in the world. Id. at 3. The United States was ranked twenty-second. Id. at
2.
119. It is worth noting, however, that in January 2003, Beth Aub, one of the founding
members of Transparency International, resigned her membership with Transparency
International for, among other things, its toleration of facilitation payments at the time. See
Bolaji Abdullahi, Bribery Scandal Rocks Transparency International, THISDAYONLINE (Jan.
14,
2003),
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2003/01/14/20030114news03.html
(reporting on the bribery scandal) (link no longer active). Aub claimed that Transparency
International at the time had ―repeatedly defended the practice‖ of facilitation payments
which she found to be wrong. Id.
120. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY 5
(2d
ed.
2009),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles.
121. Id. at 5-6. The Business Principles specifically stated that ―[t]he enterprise shall
prohibit bribery in any form whether direct or indirect‖ and ―[t]he enterprise shall commit to
implementing a Programme to counter bribery.‖ Id. at 6. The Business Principles also
stated that, ―recognizing that facilitation payments are bribes,‖ companies should strive to
―identify and eliminate them.‖ Id. at 8.
122. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY:
GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT
23
(2004),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/573/3493/file/bpcb_ti_guidance_doc_nove
mber_%202004.pdf. The guidance was designed to assist companies looking to implement
anti-bribery compliance programs or review their current compliance programs. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 23. In this respect, Transparency International stated that ―there should be no
distinction . . . between the approaches to countering petty and grand bribery.‖ Id. The
guidance document then went on to state that where an official makes a demand for a
facilitation payment that, absent a situation where life or health is threatened, that
companies should not make the payment. Id. at 23-24. It is worth noting that in July 2005,

JORDANFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)

904

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/12/2011 5:10 PM

[Vol. 13:4

The calls by Transparency International for an end to facilitation
payments grew louder than ever in 2007, when it adopted a resolution
specifically calling for an end to facilitation payments.124 The ―Resolution
on Facilitation Payments‖ adopted by Transparency International at its
annual membership meeting in October 28, 2007, noted that it had ―been
the long standing policy‖ of Transparency International ―to oppose the use
of facilitation payments‖ and called on all ―companies to cease making
such payments immediately.‖125
The resolution also stated that
Transparency International would engage in a campaign to revise all of the
relevant international treaties and conventions that permitted facilitation
payments and would also ―advocate, where appropriate, for revisions of
national and international laws‖ with respect to the permissibility of such
payments.126 Thus, the resolution did more than just call for the cessation
of facilitation payments. It also launched a new offensive plan for
Transparency International to change the laws throughout the world with
the goal of ending permissible facilitation payments.127
2.

World Economic Forum

World Economic Forum was another international non-governmental
Transparency International also published a ―Six Step Process‖ for implementing a
compliance program pursuant to the Business Principles.
See TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY: TI SIX STEP PROCESS
(2005),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/six_step_i
mplementation_process. This publication, designed to provide practical advice on
developing an effective compliance program, specifically noted that companies needed to
analyze ―the prevalence and use‖ of their employees‘ facilitating payments so that the
company could work to implement a compliance program designed to specifically
―eliminate‖ them. Id. at 9.
124. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION ON FACILITATION PAYMENTS:
ADOPTED BY THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING: BALI,
INDONESIA, 28 OCTOBER 2007 (voicing Transparency International‘s opposition to
facilitation payments).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. In a subsequent press release by Transparency International in November 2007,
the organization stated that ―[c]orporations should . . . act immediately to end the practice of
‗grease payments‘ or so-called facilitation payments that are outright bribes.‖ Press
Release, Transparency Int‘l, Transparency Int‘l Calls for Action to Enforce the OECD AntiBribery
Convention
(Nov.
20,
2007),
available
at
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2007/2007_11_21_ti_c
all_for_action_oecd. And, most recently, in its annual Global Corruption Report for 2009,
Transparency International again criticized facilitation payments and noted that there was a
―diminishing tolerance‖ for such payments in the world. GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2009: CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 118, at 120-21.
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organization that called for an end to facilitation payments.128 In 2004, the
World Economic Forum, an international organization focusing on
corporate governance, launched a ―Partnering Against Corruption
Initiative‖ designed to develop principles for the purposes of providing ―a
competitive level playing field.‖129 In 2005 the Initiative came out with its
―Principles for Countering Bribery‖ (―PACI Principles‖) which, like the
Business Principles, stated that companies should follow a policy of
prohibiting bribery ―in any form,‖ and implement that policy through an
internal compliance program.130 The PACI Principles then specifically
recommended that the internal compliance program support the elimination
of facilitation payments.131 In recommending the elimination of facilitation
payments, the PACI Principles stressed that facilitation payments were
prohibited in almost every country in the world.132
C.

TRACE Survey: International Private Sector‟s Limited Use of
Facilitation Payments

The building international storm over the issue of facilitation
payments also impacted the international private sector‘s perception and
use of these payments.
In October 2009, TRACE, a non-profit
organization that focuses on anti-bribery compliance for multinational
companies, published a global survey which revealed that many
international companies had avoided or prohibited the use of facilitation

128. The World Economic Forum is ―an independent, international organization‖ that is
―striving towards a world-class corporate governance system where values are as important
a basis as rules.‖ About Us, WORLD ECON. FORUM, (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.weforum.org/content/leadership-team. Its motto is ―entrepreneurship in the
global public interest.‖ Id.
129. Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, WORLD ECON. FORUM, (Apr. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.weforum.org/issues. As a result of the initiative, more than 110
companies throughout the world have certified that they have taken steps to make sure that
they and no persons on their behalf will commit bribery. See Gail Dutton, Do Strong Ethics
Hurt
U.S.
Global
Competitiveness?,
WORLD TRADE
(Mar.
2,
2008),
http://www.worldtrademag.com/Articles/Feature_Article/BNP_GUID_9-52006_A_10000000000000274420 (reporting on initiatives to prevent corporate bribery).
130. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PARTNERING AGAINST CORRUPTION – PRINCIPLES FOR
COUNTERING BRIBERY 11 (2005) [hereinafter PACI PRINCIPLES]. The Principles were the
product of a task force of companies of the World Economic Forum ―in partnership with
Transparency International and the Basel Institute on Governance.‖ Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 13; see also PACI PRINCIPLES, supra note 130, at 13; F. Joseph Warin,
Michael S. Diamant & Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and
Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. REV. 33, 65 (2010) (stating that the PACI Principles
recommended the elimination of facilitating payments).
132. Id.
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payments.133 The TRACE Survey, a survey of corporations located
throughout the world, examined how facilitation payments were ―perceived
in the international business community‖ and whether they were permitted
by corporations. The TRACE Survey came out with several major
findings.134 The most significant finding was that over seventy percent of
those surveyed believed that their company ―never, or only rarely‖ made
facilitation payments, even when company policies permitted them.135 In
addition, seventy-six percent of international corporations felt that it was
possible to successfully do business without having to make facilitation
payments, ―given sufficient management support and careful planning.‖136
Further, ninety-three percent of those surveyed stated that their jobs would
be ―easier, or at least no different, if facilitation payments were prohibited
in every country‖ in the world.137
The TRACE Survey results were significant because they exposed a
trend among the international corporations that responded to the survey to
avoid using facilitation payments.138 The survey also revealed a clear
―awareness‖ by these international corporations of the ―added risk‖ and
difficulties associated with making these payments.139 To this end, these
international corporations overwhelmingly favored an ideal business
environment where facilitation payments were banned in every country
throughout the world.140
VI. DIMINISHING DOMESTIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FACILITATION PAYMENTS
DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION
The growing unpopularity of facilitation payments was not limited to
the international stage during the first decade of the Convention,
unpopularity grew domestically as well. Several commentators have
remarked that the scope of the facilitation payments exception has
133. See TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2 (reporting on corporate bribery
prevention); see also News Release, TRACE, TRACE Releases the Results of Facilitation
Payments
Survey
(Oct.
15,
2009),
available
at
https://www.traceinternational.org/news/TRACEFacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults.asp
(reporting on corporate policies on facilitation payments).
134. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2.
135. Id. Forty-four percent of those surveyed stated that their company prohibited
facilitation payments or did ―not address them‖ because such payments were ―prohibited
together with other forms of bribery.‖ Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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narrowed over time.141 Recent surveys have also revealed that domestic
businesses, like their foreign counterparts, have increasingly prohibited the
use of facilitation payments within their operations.142
A.

Perceived Narrowing of the Facilitation Payments Exception

Several commentators have expressed their belief that there has been a
trend within the United States and enforcement of the FCPA that has led to
a narrowing in the scope of the facilitation payments exception.143 These
commentators have argued that the relevant regulatory authorities
enforcing the FCPA, the DOJ and SEC, have construed, and will continue
to construe, the exception more narrowly over time.144
In United States v. Kay, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was one of the first major courts to look at the facilitation
payments exception since the Convention was ratified.145 In that case the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the United States government‘s argument that the
facilitation payments exception was a very limited exception to the
otherwise broad sweep of the FCPA.146 The court reviewed the statutory
language of the FCPA, including the legislative history behind it, and found
that Congress had indeed intended to make the facilitation exception a very
limited one.147 The court noted that:
A brief review of the types of routine governmental actions
enumerated by Congress shows how limited Congress wanted to
make the grease exceptions. Routine governmental action, for
instance, includes ―obtaining permits, licenses, or other official
documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign
country,‖ and ―scheduling inspections associated with contract
performance or inspections related to transit of goods across the
country.‖ Therefore, routine governmental action does not
include the issuance of every official document or every
inspection but only (1) documentation that qualifies a party to do
business and (2) scheduling an inspection—very narrow
141. David M. Howard & Elisa T. Wiygul, FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing
“Facilitating Payments” Exception?, DECHERTONPOINT, Apr. 2010, at 2; see also Fox,
supra note 33, at 3.
142. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying discussion.
143. Patricia Brown Holmes & Valarie Hays, Grease Payments are a Thing of the Past
as the Reach of the FCPA Continues to Expand, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1 (2010); see also
Howard & Wiygul, supra note 141, at 1; Fox, supra note 33, at 3.
144. Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1; Howard and Wiygul, supra note 141, at 1;
Fox, supra note 33, at 3.
145. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
146. Id. at 745.
147. Id. at 750.
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categories of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities
performed by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.148
In finding that the exception was to be interpreted on a very narrow
basis, the court noted that ―in contrast‖ with these provisions, the FCPA
contained broad language prohibiting bribery, instead of detailed language
like that of the exception.149
Some commentators have argued that since Kay, government
regulators have continued to narrow the scope of the facilitation payments
exception.150 These commentators believe that government regulators have
begun to bring enforcement actions concerning payments that are not
clearly facilitation payments.151 For example, some commentators were
concerned over the settled enforcement action in Helmerich & Payne in
that they perceived the action to involve facilitation payments not
necessarily forbidden by the FCPA.152 In this regard, some commentators
have expressed concerns that the exception will continue to be interpreted
in a narrow fashion and, as a result, the exception will continue to remain a
gray area in the law.153

148. Id. at 750-51 (emphasis by the court).
149. Id. at 751. For an in depth analysis on United States v. Kay, see Hector Gonzalez &
Claudius Sokenu, Scope of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act‟s Bribery Provisions Set, 231
N.Y. L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing Kay and how that case officially set the scope of the FCPA);
see also Claudius O. Sokenu, FCPA Enforcement after United States v. Kay: SEC and DOJ
Team Up to Increase Consequences of FCPA Violations, 1619 PLI/CORP 189 (2007)
(examining enforcement of the FCPA post-Kay).
150. John K. Carroll & Lisa K. Marino, The Incredible Shrinking FCPA Facilitation
Payment Exception, 241 N.Y. L.J. S6 (2009).
151. Id.; see also Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1-2.
152. See Howard & Wiygul, supra note 141, at 3-4. The commentators expressed their
concerns that the case involved payments made to customs authorities for ―avoiding
potential delays‖ associated with the transportation of parts, payments these commentators
believed could be considered facilitation payments. Id.; see also Press Release 09-741,
Dep‘t of Justice, Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty to Resolve
Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America (July 30, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html. The company had entered into a
two-year deferred or non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ. See id. The SEC‘s settled
action with the company involved allegations that the company had violated the FCPA‘s
accounting provisions. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., SEC Adm. Proc. File No. 3-13565, at 4-5
(July 30, 2009); SEC News Digest, Issue 2009-145, July 30, 2009. As noted before, the
facilitation payment exception does not apply to the FCPA‘s accounting provisions. See
supra notes 31-32, and accompanying discussion. Thus, if a company records certain
relevant payments improperly, as alleged in this particular case, it can still be liable under
the FCPA‘s accounting provisions, notwithstanding whether the payments actually
constituted facilitation payments. Id.
153. Carroll & Marino, supra note 150, at S6; Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1-2.
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Domestic Companies‟ Avoidance of Facilitation Payments

Like their international counterparts, most domestic companies now
prohibit the use of facilitation payments.154 This may be for several
reasons, such as the growing unpopularity of facilitation payments
overseas, or the apparent complexities involved in complying with the gray
area of the exception itself. Whatever the reason, most domestic
companies have affirmatively sought to ban or narrow the use of
facilitation payments within their operations.155
1.

Surveys Reveal that Most Domestic Companies Prohibit the Use
of Facilitation Payments

A 2008 survey by the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski concerning
facilitation payments (―Fulbright Survey‖) found that eighty percent of
companies in the United States prohibited the use of facilitation
payments.156 The survey also found that nearly two-thirds of domestic
companies had policies expressly prohibiting the making of facilitation
payments.157 The survey further revealed that a majority of domestic
companies felt that it was better to ban facilitation payments altogether than
―explore a gray area inviting costly and embarrassing investigations for
FCPA violations.‖158
Around the same time as the Fulbright Survey, the accounting firm
KPMG conducted a survey of executives at United States multinational
corporations and came out with similar findings.159 In the KPMG survey,
154. Fulbright & Jaworski, 2008 Litigation Trends Survey shows U.S. Companies
Preparing for Rise in Litigation Following Two Years of Declines, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 14,
2008, at 8 [hereinafter Fulbright Survey].
155. Id.
156. Id. The survey involved a poll of corporate law departments. Id.; see also Joel M.
Cohen & Adam P. Wolf, Narrow, Don‟t Abolish, FCPA Facilitating Payments Exception,
244 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2010); Roger M. Witten, Recent Developments in FCPA and Global Antibribery Enforcement, 1814 PLI/CORP 901 (2010).
157. Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8.
158. Id. The survey noted that twenty percent of the billion dollar companies polled had
undertaken a bribery or corruption investigation in the past year. Id. The survey also found
that twenty-three percent of United States companies had ―made the decision to walk away
from doing business in a country based on the perceived degree of local corruption.‖ Id.;
see also FCPA Takes Bite into Company Activities, COMPLIANCE REPORTER, Oct. 17, 2008
(explaining the effect of the FCPA exception on companies and that companies have
reassessed whether to do ―business in a country based on the perceived degree of local
corruption.‖).
159. KPMG Survey Finds Most Global U.S. Companies Face Challenges with their AntiBribery, Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 2008. The
KPMG Survey was a poll of 103 executives from multinational United States companies. Id.
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only twenty-five percent of executives surveyed stated that their companies
still allowed facilitation payments.160
These surveys suggest that domestic companies would rather ban the
use of facilitation payments than make these kinds of payments and deal
with the adverse consequences. Many of these companies have probably
learned that making such payments will enter them into the complex realm
of conflicting domestic and international laws regarding the legality of such
payments. So, they have simply avoided making them altogether. As one
FCPA expert has stated, many companies have decided to ban facilitations
payments entirely because it is ―an easier, simpler line to draw.‖161
2.

The Higher Cost of Facilitation Payments

Many domestic companies have discovered that making facilitation
payments can be a very costly endeavor.162 Government officials seeking
bribes target the companies that they know will pay them, and this in turn
leads to higher costs imposed on those companies that choose to engage in
this kind of activity.163 As one commentator put it, paying a facilitation
payment or any kind of bribe is equivalent to ―putting a bull‘s eye on your
company‘s forehead.‖164 Those companies that pay them will be targeted
and will be expected to continue making such payments in the future.165
A study by TRACE in 2003 entitled ―The High Cost of Small Bribes‖
supports the position that facilitation payments can be quite costly to
companies over the long run.166 The study found that ―[w]idespread small
bribes set a permissive tone, which invites more and greater demands.‖167
In this respect, the study revealed that ―entrepreneurial bribe-takers learn to
focus their demands on companies that have paid bribes before‖ and
therefore will continue to expect these payments well into the future.168
160. Id.
161. Melissa Klein Aguilar, Facilitation Payments still leave Companies Vexed,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Dec. 2009, at 12 (quoting Lucinda Low, a partner in the law firm of
Steptoe & Johnson and expert in the FCPA).
162. Dutton, supra note 129.
163. Id.
164. Id. Alexandra Wrage, president of TRACE, warned that companies paying bribes
often make themselves a target to foreign officials for the payment of more bribes. Id.
165. Id. One senior executive equated facilitation payments and ―small-time corruption‖
to be like ―low-level cancer‖ in that ―[e]ventually it will kill you.‖ Id. (quoting Tom
McCoy, executive vice president and chief administrative officer of Advanced Micro
Devices).
166. TRACE, THE HIGH COST OF SMALL BRIBES (2009), available at
https://www.traceinternational.org/documents/TheHighCostofSmallBribes.pdf.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
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The study also concluded that it makes ―better business sense‖ to end the
practice of making facilitation payments, rather than continuing to making
such payments.169
Whichever their reasons, whether for compliance, regulatory, or
simply business motivations, companies in the United States have
increasingly refrained from making facilitation payments, notwithstanding
the fact that the FCPA still allows for them. This domestic undercurrent
against facilitation payments, flowing parallel to the growing international
disdain for them, will soon lead the issue into the spotlight on the
international stage, through actions taken by the OECD.
VII. OECD CALLS ON SIGNATORY COUNTRIES TO COMBAT AND PROHIBIT
FACILITATION PAYMENTS
In late 2009, the OECD changed its stance with respect to its view on
facilitation payments through the OECD Recommendation.170 Rather than
condemning facilitation payments and calling for their elimination through
corporate governance programs as it had done before, the OECD instead,
through the OECD Recommendation, called on countries to directly
combat facilitation payments and encourage companies under their
jurisdiction to prohibit them.171
A.

OECD Recommendation

On November 26, 2009, the OECD adopted the OECD
Recommendation.172 The OECD Recommendation is an agreement by the
OECD member countries, and eight other countries that signed the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, to ―put in place new measures‖ designed to
―reinforce their efforts to prevent, detect and investigate foreign bribery.‖173
169. Id.
170. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2.
173. OECD, Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, (Dec. 9, 2009),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_44232739_1_1_1_1,00.
html; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 3. The thirty OECD member countries and
eight other countries that signed the Convention, or thirty-eight nations overall, ―make up
the vast majority of international business deals, accounting for roughly two-thirds of world
exports and nearly ninety percent of global outward flows of foreign direct investment.‖
OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 4. The OECD Recommendation was the product of a
review of various OECD anti-bribery measures as well as consultations with legal experts,
international organizations, prosecutors, private-sector representatives, and individuals in
the accounting and auditing profession. Id. at 7. One of the consultation sessions that took
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December 9, 2009, marked the tenth anniversary of the Convention‘s entry
into force, and on that day the OECD, at a Transparency International event
marking ―International Anti-Corruption Day,‖ announced the release of the
OECD Recommendation.174
One of the key announcements in the OECD Recommendation was
that the OECD was now calling for an end to permissible facilitation
payments.175
Specifically, the relevant provision in the OECD
Recommendation dealing with facilitation payments stated that the OECD:
RECOMMENDS, in view of the corrosive effect of small
facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable economic
development and the rule of law that Member countries should:
i) undertake to periodically review their policies and approach
on small facilitation payments in order to effectively combat
the phenomenon;
ii) encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of
small facilitation payments in internal company controls,
ethics and compliance programmes or measures, recognising
that such payments are generally illegal in the countries where
they are made, and must in all cases be accurately accounted
for in such companies‘ books and financial records.176
This recommendation represented a stronger and more aggressive
position taken from the OECD against facilitation payments, because it
called on both governments and companies to prohibit and end the use of
facilitation payments.177 As it applied to governments, the OECD
Recommendation stated that signatory countries, including the United
States, should review their policies and approach on ―corrosive‖ facilitation
payments in order to ―effectively combat the phenomenon‖ of facilitation
place in October 2009 specifically focused on the issue of facilitation payments. Id. at 83.
174. Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, supra note 173; Good News
at Today‟s OECD Celebration, TRACEBLOG (Dec. 9, 2009, 2:21 PM), available at
http://traceblog.org/2009/12/09/good-news-at-todays-oecd-celebration/.
The day was
marked with great fanfare and involved OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría and U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke jointly unveiling the OECD Recommendation via video
from Washington D.C. Id. Video-recorded remarks from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton marked the opening of the celebration. Id.
175. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4; R. Christopher Cook & Stephanie L.
Connor, United States: OECD Calls for an End to Facilitating Payments Exception,
MONDAQ
(Dec.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=91384. On this day, the OECD
also launched a so-called ―Initiative to Raise Global Awareness of Foreign Bribery,‖ which
is a three-year initiative designed to engage the public and ―convince them that foreign
bribery carries a heavy price, that it is a serious crime and that it is no longer a part of
business as usual.‖ OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 12-13.
176. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.
177. Id.
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payments.178 One could perceive this as a call on all five countries that
have laws permitting the use of facilitation payments overseas, including
the United States, to review their policies and laws relevant to these
payments with a view towards prohibiting them.179 And as it pertains to the
United States, one could perceive this to mean that the United States should
review its policies regarding facilitation payments, and the FCPA‘s
exception for them, with a view towards changing those policies, and
potentially amending the FCPA, to effectively ―combat‖ the use of them.180
The OECD Recommendation also called on signatory countries to
encourage companies within their jurisdictions to prohibit or discourage the
use of facilitation payments through their internal controls, ethics and
compliance programs.181 With respect to the United States, this would
mean that the United States government would have to ―encourage‖
domestic companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments, through
their internal company controls, ethics and compliance programs, even
though such facilitation payments might still be allowable under the
FCPA.182
The OECD Recommendation‘s provisions regarding facilitation
payments present an interesting irony with respect to the United States and
the FCPA. While the OECD Recommendation calls on the United States to
review its approach towards facilitation payments in the FCPA with a view
towards combating and prohibiting them, and calls on the United States to
encourage domestic corporations to prohibit such payments through
internal controls and compliance programs, what will happen if the United
States delays or takes no action with respect to the FCPA‘s facilitation
payments exception? Is it still obligated to ―encourage‖ companies to
prohibit facilitation payments? Even though the FCPA still allows for
them? Policy-wise, the United States could still ―encourage‖ domestic
companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments, while still allowing
for them under the FCPA, knowing how such activity can be harmful to
178. Id. It is interesting that the OECD expressed its disdain for facilitation payments by
including strong language about the ―corrosive effect‖ of such payments—language that is
similar to the ―corrosive phenomenon‖ language previously used by it in describing
facilitation payments in the Convention. Id.; see also OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
supra note 3, at Commentary 9.
179. See OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Another relevant provision relating to facilitation payments in the OECD
Recommendation stated that the OECD ―[urges] all countries to raise awareness of their
public officials on their domestic bribery and solicitation laws with a view to stopping the
solicitation and acceptance of small facilitation payments.‖ Id. This provision appeared to
be directed to countries where public officials receive facilitation payments and seeks to
repress the demand-side of facilitation payments. Id.
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domestic companies given that most foreign countries‘ domestic laws
prohibit them. This would be analogous to the United States government
encouraging its citizens not to smoke, while still allowing them to legally
do so, despite knowledge that smoking can be detrimental to their health.
Whether the United States will take such an approach, or legally prohibit
the permissible use of facilitation payments altogether within the FCPA,
remains to be seen.
B.

New Phase 3 OECD Monitoring

Coinciding with the announcement of the OECD Recommendation,
the OECD Working Group adopted a new third round of monitoring related
to the Convention in December 2009.183 The Phase 3 monitoring, which
began in 2010, focused on enforcement of the Convention and any
outstanding recommendations made during the first two phases of
monitoring.184 With respect to the United States and the issue of facilitation
payments, Phase 3 monitoring also focused on how countries had been
implementing the OECD Recommendation.185 Like the previous two
phases of monitoring, the Working Group planned to publish its
recommendations with respect to its evaluation at the end of the monitoring
process.186
C.

Good Practice Guidance

A few months after the OECD Recommendation, on February 18,
2010, the OECD adopted and published, as part of the OECD
Recommendation, its Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics,
and Compliance (―Good Practice Guidance‖).187 The Good Practice
Guidance, a set of standards for companies to follow in establishing
effective internal controls and compliance programs designed to detect and

183. OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 14.
184. Id. at 14-15.
185. Id. at 14.
186. OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77.
187. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance,
(Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Good Practice Guidance]. The Good Practice Guidance was
adopted as an ―integral part‖ of the Recommendation and became Annex II to the
Recommendation itself. Id.; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 1. OECD SecretaryGeneral Angel Gurría announced the Good Practice Guidance on March 3, 2010, as ―the
most comprehensive guidance ever provided to companies and business organisations by an
international organization‖ on the issue of anti-bribery internal controls and compliance
programs. Press Release, OECD, OECD Calls on Businesses to Step Up Their Fight
Against Bribery (Mar. 3, 2010) (quoting OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría).
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prevent foreign bribery, was the first time a set of international anti-bribery
compliance standards had been endorsed by multiple governments.188
On the issue of facilitation payments, the Good Practice Guidance
called on companies to adopt compliance programs or measures designed
to address facilitation payments.189 More specifically, the Good Practice
Guidance recommended that companies consider ―ethics and compliance
programmes or measures designed to prevent and detect foreign bribery
applicable to all directors, officers, and employees, and applicable to all
entities over which a company has effective control‖ in the area of
―facilitation payments.‖190
D.

Initial Domestic Response to the OECD‟s Call for an End to
Facilitation Payments

The OECD‘s new position in calling for an end to facilitation
payments represented an important development in the international antibribery arena. While the OECD Recommendation is not technically a part
of the Convention, and the OECD does not have any power to force the
new legislation or laws of any relevant country as a result of its

188. Id.; Good Practice Guidance, supra note 187, at 2. The Good Practices Guidance,
among other things, essentially called on companies to adopt a ―clear and visible‖ policy on
anti-bribery, ensure compliance with such policy ―at all levels‖ within their organizations,
and provide ―regular communication and training‖ on the issue of foreign bribery to both
employees and ―business partners.‖ OECD Calls on Businesses to Step Up their Fight
Against Bribery, supra note 187.
189. Good Practice Guidance, supra note 187, at 3.
190. Id. The Good Practice Guidance appeared to have received the endorsement of the
DOJ at the time that it came out. See David Heckler, „Roided Up Enforcement: DOJ Unit
that Prosecutes FCPA to Bulk up „Substantially,‟ CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 25, 2010
(suggesting the DOJ‘s endorsement of the Good Practice Guidance). Mark Mendelsohn, the
Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section at the DOJ‘s Criminal Division in February 2010, was
reported to have stated in a speech at the time that the OECD would be publishing its Good
Practice Guidance and that such guidance would arrive with the approval of the DOJ. Id.
Mendelsohn provided the comments during a speaking engagement at the Global Ethics
Summit 2010 in New York City. Id.; see also Melissa Klein Aguilar, OECD Anti-Bribery
Guide as Path to FCPA Compliance, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Mar. 30, 2010 (stating that
Mendelsohn announced the DOJ‘s approval of the OECD guidance at a February 2010 anticorruption conference). A DOJ spokesman declined to make Mendelsohn available for
further comment at the time. Id. Mendelsohn has since moved on to the private sector. In a
recent interview, Mendelsohn described the Good Practice Guidance as a ―high-water mark‖
as far as best practices for preventing and detecting bribery and said that his role in the
drafting and adoption of the Good Practice Guidance was ―one of the things‖ that he was the
―most proud of‖ from his time at the DOJ. Recent Top DOJ Official Shares Insights into
FCPA Policies, Enforcement Strategies, Public-Private Cooperation and Role of the OECD,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2, 2010 (quoting Mark F. Mendelsohn of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP).
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recommendations, any message or recommendation from the OECD still
carries tremendous weight.191 One would imagine that it would be very
difficult for the United States, the country who approached the OECD as a
means for seeking an international agreement against foreign bribery, to
ignore the OECD‘s calls. The United States has not appeared to have done
so—at least not yet.192
Between the time of the OECD Recommendation and the OECD‘s
Phase 3 Report on the United States, there were no legislative or regulatory
developments to change or eliminate the facilitation payments exception.
However there was a lot of talk on the issue. At least one commentator
expressed an opinion that there would likely be an effort by the United
States to amend the FCPA to eliminate the exception.193 In addition, a
couple of senior DOJ officials also weighed in on the issue. On April 8,
2010, Charles Duross, an Assistant Chief with the Fraud Section at the
DOJ‘s Criminal Division, indicated during a panel discussion that the DOJ
was ―not encouraging‖ facilitation payments.194 And on May 26, 2010,
Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ‘s Criminal
Division, indicated during a conference that the DOJ was open to revisiting
the exception.195 In his remarks, Breuer stated that revisiting the exception
was something ―worth discussing‖ and that he did not necessarily ―rule . . .
out‖ such a revisit happening.196

191. See Cook & Connor, supra note 175 (stating that ―[a]lthough the OECD has no
power to enact legislation, the organization has been the primary force behind the
promulgation of anticorruption laws‖).
192. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton provided positive remarks during the OECD‘s announcement of the OECD
Recommendation. See Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, supra note
173. In her remarks, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that ―the United States
fully supports the OECD‘s anti-corruption agenda.‖ Id.
193. A Fresh Look at the FCPA, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 1, 2010
(Interview of R. Christopher Cook of Jones Day).
194. Christopher M. Matthews, Compliance Monitors are Here to Stay, MAIN JUSTICE,
Apr. 8, 2010 (quoting Charles Duross, Assistant Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice). The comments were made at an event entitled ―Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: What you Need to Know,‖ hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations on
April 8, 2010. Id.
195. Christopher M. Matthews, Breuer: Facilitating Payments Worth Discussing, MAIN
JUSTICE, May 26, 2010. The comments were made at the Compliance Week Fifth Annual
Conference. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
Breuer also noted that while he was ―not currently aware of any real movement to make that
change‖ in the United States, that he thought that ―as other countries[‘] laws evolve and
mature . . . I suspect over time, we too will be modifying our law.‖ Id.
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VIII. OECD APPLIES PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES IN THE OECD
PHASE 3 REPORT
On October 15, 2010, the OECD Working Group came out with its
Phase 3 Report on the United States.197 The Phase 3 review, designed to
look at both the outstanding recommendations made during the first two
phases of monitoring, as well as how the United States was putting the
OECD Recommendation into action, marked the first time the United
States and the FCPA had faced a review by the OECD since the OECD‘s
initial call for the elimination of facilitation payments in the OECD
Recommendation.198
A.

OECD Phase 3 Report on the United States

The OECD Phase 3 Report criticized the United States for its policies
on facilitation payments, yet praised the country for encouraging domestic
companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments in their operations.199
1.

Criticism of the United States over its Policies and Approach on
Facilitation Payments

With respect to the first key recommendation in the OECD
Recommendation that ―in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation
payments,‖ member countries ―undertake to periodically review their
policies and approach on small facilitation payments in order to effectively
combat the phenomenon,‖ the OECD once again criticized the United
States for what it perceived to be a lack of guidance on the FCPA‘s
facilitation payments exception.200 On this issue, the OECD noted that it
had previously recommended that the United States consider developing
197. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1.
198. See id. at 6. Interestingly, the United States did not shy away from the Phase 3
review, and the challenges that would come under it, but volunteered to be one of the first
countries to come under the review. Press Release, OECD, U.S. 1 of First 2 Volunteers to
Undergo Rigorous Phase 3 Peer Review, United States Mission to the OECD, Oct. 13, 2010,
available at http://usoecd.usmission.gov/antibribery-phase-3.html. In volunteering for the
review, U.S. Ambassador to the OECD Karen Kornbluth stated that ―[w]e were pleased to
be among the first countries to go under the magnifying glass of peer scrutiny at the OECD
Phase 3 review.‖ Id. (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the OECD Karen Kornbluth). She stated
that ―[a]s one of the first two volunteers to be reviewed, the U.S. is setting a high standard
for the ‗race to the top‘ expected of all Convention signatories.‖ Id.
199. See Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24.
200. Id.; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. This was a criticism previously
noted in the second phases of review. See supra notes 115 through 117 and accompanying
discussion.
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―specific guidance on the application‖ of the exception but that the United
States had not done so.201 The OECD also repeated its criticism of the
exception for failing to limit it to ―small‖ payments, as provided under
Commentary 9 to the Convention.202
Of particular interest in the Phase 3 Report is its indication that the
United States would continue to review its policies on facilitation
payments.203 Specifically, the Working Group stated that DOJ Assistant
Attorney General Breuer had told them during a welcoming address that
the exception would continue to come under United States review, as
recommended by the OECD Recommendation.204 To this end, the Working
Group suggested that the United States consider comments by compliance
experts and the private sector in any such continued review, noting that
most of the compliance experts and private sector representatives that they
had spoken with had felt that the exception was unclear or needed further
guidance.205
2.

Praise for United States Encouragement of Companies to Prohibit
or Discourage Facilitation Payments

Unlike the criticism of the United States for its policies on facilitation
payments, the Phase 3 Report praised the United States for steps taken to
comply with the second core part of the OECD Recommendation—that the
United States ―encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of

201. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24. The OECD noted, however, that the DOJ
had responded to its concerns in this area by noting that no one from the private sector had
ever submitted a ―request for an Opinion Procedure Release on the application of the
exception‖ and therefore it believed that there was sufficient guidance out in the public
concerning the exception. Id. at 23. The United States had also stated that the defense bar
―rarely‖ raised the exception during enforcement actions and therefore that the FCPA bar
understood the exception and found it to be ―clear.‖ Id. at 23.
202. Id. at 23-24; OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. This
was another criticism previously noted in the second phase of review. See supra note 112
and accompanying discussion.
203. See id. at 24 (―[T]he exception for facilitation payments will continue to come
under review . . . .‖); see also OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.
204. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 24.
205. See id. The Working Group noted that all of the representatives from the business
sectors that they had spoken with had the opinion ―that the scope‖ of the facilitation
payment exception was ―unclear.‖ Id. The Working Group also noted that all but one of the
compliance experts that they had spoken with believed that further guidance was necessary.
Id. The Phase 3 Report specifically recommended that the ―the United States, in its periodic
review of facilitation payment pursuant to the OECD Recommendation, consider the views
of the private sector and civil society, particularly on ways of clarifying the ‗grey‘ areas
identified by them.‖ Id.
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small facilitation payments.‖206 The United States, in response to questions
from the Phase 3 review, noted several steps that it had undertaken to be
proactive in encouraging companies to prohibit or discourage the use of
facilitation payments.207 The United States stated that the SEC‘s Division
of Enforcement had been ―instrumental in encouraging companies to
prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation payments and ensure
that, where they are made, they are accurately accounted for in companies‘
books and financial records by instituting actions against public companies
that fail in this regard.‖208 The United States also noted that DOJ, SEC and
United States Department of Commerce officials had spoken at numerous
anti-bribery conferences where these officials ―encouraged companies to
prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation payments.‖209 The Phase
3 Report stated that ―civil society . . . welcomed recent public statements
by the United States government that ma[d]e it very clear that [facilitation]
payments are not condoned and that companies should take steps to
eliminate them.‖210 The report then noted that the evaluators commended
the United States for ―recent steps taken in line‖ with the OECD
Recommendation ―to encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the
use of facilitation payments.‖211
The Phase 3 Report that came out in October 2010 was not the end of
the Phase 3 review. In fact, the Phase 3 review is scheduled to go on for at
least another two years, during which time the OECD will continue to
apply pressure on the United States to review its policies on facilitation
payments. The United States is scheduled to do an oral report to follow up
on its implementation of key recommendations made by the Working
Group after one year of the Phase 3 Report.212 The United States will next
be required to submit a written report on these issues within two years of
the report, which will then be the subject of a publicly available evaluation
by the Working Group concerning its implementation of the relevant
recommendations.213

206. Id.; see also OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.
207. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Response of the United States Questions
Concerning
Phase
3,
at
42-43
(May
3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf.
208. Id. at 42.
209. Id. at 43
210. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 24.
211. Id.
212. Press Release, OECD, United States: OECD Recognizes Anti-Bribery Enforcement
and Recommends Enhancement (Oct. 20, 2010).
213. Id.
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IX. POTENTIAL FUTURE EFFORTS BY THE OECD TO END FACILITATION
PAYMENTS
It will be interesting to see what the United States will do with respect
to facilitation payments given the continued pressure by the OECD. If
nothing is done by the end of the Phase 3 review, it would not be surprising
if the OECD considered a repeal of Commentary 9 to the Convention.214
After all, it seems hypocritical for the OECD to call for an end to
facilitation payments, and criticize the United States and the FCPA‘s
exception for them, when the OECD and the Convention itself still allows
for such payments.215
It is therefore this author‘s prediction that if the United States does not
address and end the facilitation payments exception during the OECD‘s
Phase 3 review, that the OECD may repeal, or at least seriously consider a
repeal of, Commentary 9 to the Convention. This would place the OECD
in a high-stakes game against the United States, since such a repeal would
potentially force the United States to either eliminate the facilitation
payments exception as a means for complying with the Convention, or drop
out of the Convention altogether. The OECD may be hesitant to pose such
a challenge on the United States. However, given the OECD‘s call for an
end to facilitation payments, it will be hard for the OECD to continue to
allow Commentary 9 to be a part of the Convention.
X.

PREDICTION THAT THE FCPA‘S FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION
WILL EVENTUALLY BE ELIMINATED

The United States, through the enactment of the FCPA, was the first
country to address the problems of foreign bribery and global corruption.
In doing so, it placed domestic companies at a competitive disadvantage to
their foreign counterparts as a result of the FCPA. The legislators thus
provided a facilitation payments exception as a means for easing the burden
on domestic companies.216 At the time, at least during the creation of the
FCPA, it seemed like the reasonable thing to do. Yet, when the United
States originally provided for the facilitation payments exception, it never
truly accepted the morality of such facilitation payments, viewing such
payments as ―reprehensible,‖ and only allowing for them because they
were ―not necessarily‖ viewed reprehensible ―elsewhere in the world.‖217
Things are different now. Most of the civilized world no longer
214.
215.
216.
217.

OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.
Id.
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying discussion.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
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condones facilitation payments.218 The 1988 Amendments, calling on the
United States government to pursue an international anti-bribery treaty
through the OECD, set in motion an ever-growing snowball against
facilitation payments.219 The United States approached the OECD for an
international anti-bribery treaty, the OECD followed up with the
Convention, countries implemented the Convention into their own foreign
anti-bribery laws, and now most of the civilized world has laws outlawing
foreign bribery.220 The world caught up to the United States on the foreign
bribery front. But on the issue of facilitation payments, the world
continued to move forward as well. As a result, the FCPA, the first and
premier foreign anti-bribery law, has been left behind with respect to its
permissibility for facilitation payments. And while the FCPA contains
several core provisions that will always withstand the test of time, the
facilitation payments exception is out of date in this modern-day era of
commerce and sensibility.
It is therefore this author‘s opinion that the FCPA will be amended to
end the facilitation payments exception. The United States will do so
mainly because of the international pressure, including that from the
OECD, to eliminate the exception. And while the United States will not
necessarily have to bend to international pressure, it is doubtful that it will
fight such pressure in defending an unpopular exception for an activity that
it considers ―reprehensible‖ and is ―encouraging‖ domestic companies to
avoid.221 Instead, the United States, as the leading nation in pursuing
foreign bribery, will eliminate the facilitation payments exception so that it
can catch up with the rest of the world in banning such payments, instead
of trailing or lagging behind.222
This author also believes that, while we are eventually headed down a
path towards the elimination of the facilitation payments exception, such an
elimination will not happen in the near future. The facilitation payments
exception became law through the relevant statute of the FCPA and the
very act of repealing that law will require legislative amendments to the
FCPA, a difficult and time-consuming process. 223 Furthermore, without a
218. See TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2; Aguilar, supra note 33; Fox, supra note 33,
at 3.
219. See 1988 Amendments, supra note 10.
220. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3; TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33,
at 2.
221. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); Response of the United States Questions
Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery, supra note 207, at 42-43. In
addition, eighty percent of domestic companies have already prohibited the practice of
making facilitation payments. See Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8.
222. Sokenu, supra note 100, at 651-52.
223. See Response of the United States Questions Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working
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strong mandate to amend the FCPA, such as the criticisms that preceded
the 1988 Amendments and the Convention that preceded the 1998
Amendments, there may not be an impetus strong enough to get Congress
to amend the FCPA in the very near future.224 Therefore, it may be years
before the exception will be eliminated. Nevertheless, this author believes
that the exception will eventually be eliminated.
XI. COMPANIES SHOULD PROHIBIT FACILITATION PAYMENTS AS A BEST
PRACTICE NOW
As a best practice, companies should ban facilitation payments
altogether. Not because they necessarily have to under the FCPA, or
because the relevant domestic regulatory authorities are encouraging them
to end the practice, but because it is a best practice that will save them time,
money, and energy, now and in the future.
Eighty percent of domestic companies have already banned
facilitation payments for good reason.225 But for those that have not, this
author recommends that they do so, especially as this global anti-bribery
environment becomes increasingly hostile to facilitation payments.
Banning facilitation payments from their operations will allow companies
to avoid legal liability and the higher costs associated with making such
payments. It will also allow them to stay ahead of the regulatory landscape
that will likely completely prohibit facilitation payments in the near future.
A.

Avoid Potential Domestic and Foreign Legal Liability Involved in
Making Facilitation Payments
Companies should prohibit facilitation payments from their operations

Group on Bribery, supra note 207, at Appendix H. In an interesting survey done in May
2009 by the OECD Working Group, the Working Group asked the United States whether it
was in favor of repealing or maintaining the exception for ―small‖ facilitation payments as
provided for in Commentary 9. Id. In its response, the United States stated that it was in
favor of maintaining Commentary 9 but then went into the difficulties involved if it would
be required to change its exception. Id. In the response, the United States stated, ―[w]e
would like to reiterate that the Commentary to the Convention was included in the
transmittal package sent to the U.S. Senate for approval as part of the Convention
ratification process and emphasize that such a change would require at a minimum
consultations with the Senate.‖ Id. It then stated that ―such a change would require an
amendment to our criminal statute, which would necessitate approval by both houses of
Congress.‖ Id.
224. See supra notes 51-59, 74-83 and accompanying discussion. Nevertheless, any
change to the Convention, such as the elimination of Commentary 9 or otherwise, could
force the legislators to act and amend the FCPA accordingly.
225. Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8.
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to avoid facing potential adverse legal consequences. Facilitation
payments are considered small-time bribes illegal under almost every
domestic bribery law in the world.226 Thus, every time a company
condones and makes a facilitation payment in an overseas jurisdiction, it
runs the risk of getting caught and prosecuted under a foreign jurisdiction‘s
domestic bribery law. In addition, most countries‘ foreign anti-bribery
laws criminalize such payments. For example, the new United Kingdom
Bribery Act criminalizes foreign bribery and does not provide an exception
for facilitation payments.227 And while the FCPA itself still provides an
exception for facilitation payments, the exception itself is arguably
becoming a more gray area of the law and one subject to narrowing
interpretation.228 Thus, even under the FCPA, the making of a facilitation
payment will oftentimes be a very dangerous endeavor.
There is also the Catch-22 problem that every time a domestic
company makes a facilitation payment that is legal under the FCPA, it may
be illegal under a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery law. The
company could either conceal the payment in violation of the FCPA‘s
accounting provisions, or properly record the payment and confess to
making a bribe in violation of a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic
bribery law. Either way, it is a no-win situation. The domestic company
making a facilitation payment thus stands to lose and faces legal liability,
no matter what it does. This practice just does not make sense, at least not
from a legal point of view.
B.

Avoid Higher Costs Involved in Making Facilitation Payments

Another reason why companies should prohibit facilitation payments
within their operations is that they are very costly. There is a complex
matrix of domestic and foreign anti-bribery laws that companies must
navigate when making facilitation payments, and steering through that
matrix can be a compliance nightmare and a costly legal undertaking. The
costs involved in making facilitation payments are likely to overwhelm any
benefits that companies might receive from making them.229
Moreover, studies have shown that making facilitation payments,
regardless of legality, can be very costly for companies from a business

226. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2.
227. Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter UK Bribery Act]. The UK
Bribery Act will come into force on July 1, 2011.
228. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying discussion.
229. It is for this reason that eighty percent of domestic companies have decided that it
was better to ban making facilitation payments altogether than to continue making them.
See Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8.
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expense perspective.230 Companies making facilitation payments place
bullseyes on their foreheads that can be seen by ―entrepreneurial bribetakers‖ who will expect further payments in the future and will make even
greater demands.231 These costs on companies can be much higher than
anticipated and can be a burdensome expense that may forever haunt them.
Another cost that might be incurred by companies making facilitation
payments is the cost of dealing with potential government investigations
and regulatory matters, domestic or foreign, as a result of making such
payments. As noted before, companies making facilitation payments are
likely violating some kind of law, whether it be domestic or foreign, and
these companies will need to deal with the costly legal expense of
defending themselves from potential charges, not to mention penalties and
fines that might be imposed on them, should they be found guilty of any
violations.232
C.

Stay Ahead of a Future Legal Horizon That May Completely Outlaw
Facilitation Payments

A third reason why companies should prohibit making facilitation
payments is that the legal avenue for making such payments is quickly
fading away.
The building international criticism and regulatory
frameworks banning facilitation payments have made it increasingly
difficult or impossible to make facilitation payments without violating
some kind of law. Furthermore, the legal permissibility gap that existed for
facilitation payments back when the FCPA was enacted in 1977 is virtually
nonexistent today.
Although five countries currently allow for facilitation payments
under their foreign anti-bribery laws, the OECD‘s recent calls for an end to
these payments will likely put pressure on all OECD countries to amend
and change their laws to eliminate their allowance. It is this author‘s view
that the OECD‘s calls will also put pressure on non-signatory nations to the
Convention to eliminate their allowance as many of these nations may want
to become signatories to the Convention in the future. Therefore, most, if
not all, countries in the world will eventually prohibit the use of facilitation
payments. In this respect, the few domestic companies that still engage in
making facilitation payments should stay ahead of the game and eliminate
230. TRACE, THE HIGH COST OF SMALL BRIBES, supra note 166, at 8-9; Dutton, supra
note 129.
231. Id.
232. See Thomas Fox, What is the Cost of FCPA Compliance (or Non-Compliance)?,
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, Jun. 3, 2010. The cost for companies to defend themselves in
FCPA investigations can easily run in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. Id.
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the practice now so that they will be ready for a potential future regulatory
landscape that may one day universally prohibit facilitation payments.
XII. CONCLUSION
The facilitation payments exception has become a dinosaur remnant of
a bygone era, a part of a foreign anti-bribery statute in the FCPA that was
enacted during a time in the 1970s when corruption was prevalent and no
international treaty existed to prohibit foreign bribery. It was reasonable
for the United States to provide an exception for facilitation payments at
the time, when the main provisions of the FCPA already placed a difficult
burden on domestic companies, and the elimination of facilitation
payments would have made the burden much more difficult. But times
have changed.
The United States pushed hard for an international anti-bribery regime
so that it would no longer be isolated in the fight against foreign bribery
that left its domestic companies at an unfair disadvantage when competing
in the global marketplace. These efforts have been tremendously
successful and have led to an international anti-bribery environment that
continues to develop and mature to this very day. However, these efforts
have also backfired on the United States, as it now finds itself awkwardly
criticized by the rest of the world for its own anti-bribery deficiencies
inherent in the facilitation payments exception. Rather than fight the
criticisms, the United States should embrace them and consider eliminating
the exception once and for all. That way, the United States can join the rest
of the world in condemning facilitation payments and fulfill its leadership
role in the fight against foreign bribery.

